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Abstract 
Prior research has firmly established that consumers draw benefits from a firm’s engagement 
in corporate social responsibility (CSR), especially the feeling of a “warm glow.” These 
benefits positively affect several desirable outcomes, such as willingness to pay or customer 
loyalty. The authors propose that consumers do not blindly perceive benefits from a firm’s 
CSR engagement, but tend to suspect that a firm’s prices include a mark-up to finance the 
CSR engagement. Taking customers’ benefit perceptions and price mark-up inferences into 
account, the authors suggest that CSR engagement has mixed effects on consumers’ 
evaluation of price fairness and, thus, subsequent outcomes such as customer loyalty. The 
authors conducted one qualitative study and four quantitative studies leveraging longitudinal 
field and experimental data of over 4,000 customers showing that customers in fact infer CSR 
price mark-ups, entailing mixed effects of firms’ CSR engagement on price fairness. The 
authors find that perception critically depends on customers’ CSR attributions and explore the 
underlying psychological mechanisms. They propose communication strategies to optimize 
the effect of CSR engagement on perceived price fairness. 
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Firms frequently engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) as they seek to be perceived as a 
fair market actor (Campbell 2007). From customers’ perspective, a key manifestation of a firm’s 
fairness in the exchange relationship is price fairness (Guo 2015; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). 
However, the impact of CSR activities on customers’ perceptions of price fairness has not 
previously been explored. Prior research might lead to the assumption of a positive association of 
CSR engagement and perceived price fairness (e.g., Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007; De 
Pelsmacker, Driesen, and Rayp 2005; Lichtenstein, Drumright, and Braig 2004), since the “warm 
glow” experienced through helping others adds to customers’ benefits from the relationship with 
the firm (Andrews et al. 2014).  
However, we argue that despite its intuitive appeal, this logic may be misleading, as 
customers do not judge price fairness solely on the basis of the benefits they obtain. Instead, prior 
research established that customers weigh the benefits against costs induced by a purchase 
(Homans 1961; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Hence, how CSR actions relate to perceived price 
fairness depends not only on customers’ “warm glow” but also on the question of how CSR 
engagement affects customers’ cost perceptions. Specifically, if customers infer that a company 
charges higher prices to finance its CSR engagement, their perception of price fairness may not 
improve and may even deteriorate indicating a negative effect of CSR on price fairness.  
Anecdotal evidence confirms that customers may consider CSR price mark-ups by 
viewing firms “to pass on responsibility and cost for sustainability initiatives down the supply 
chain whilst taking the credit” (CorporateWatch 2006, p. 16). Similarly, Chandler and Werther 
(2014, p. 166) indicate that firms might “pass [CSR] cost increases on to their customers in the 
form of higher prices”. In this respect, a recent Forbes article claims that “consumers and the 
public expect sustainability as a baseline condition of business [but] they don’t expect to pay for 
it” (Unruh 2011).  
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To our best knowledge, the notion that CSR engagement may induce customers to infer a 
cost burden has not been the subject of previous marketing research. Consequently, prior 
marketing research cannot fully explain the CSR–price fairness linkage, and how firms’ CSR 
activities influence the perception of price fairness remains unclear. Web Appendix W1 
illustrates the research void addressed in this study. 
This prevailing unclarity is not only troublesome for marketing research but also 
problematic for managerial practice, since firms lack guidance on how to effectively manage the 
price-related consequences of their CSR. If being perceived as socially caring comes at the 
expense of a firm’s price image, the firm will face a goal conflict, requiring careful management 
of the trade-off between being perceived as fair in terms of social engagement and fair in terms of 
price. Hence, examining the CSR–price fairness linkage is highly relevant to the effectiveness of 
firms’ strategies to manage price-related consequences of their social activities.  
In light of the strong theoretical and practical significance, we explore in detail the 
relationship between firms’ CSR engagement and customer perceptions of price fairness as well 
as the underlying psychological mechanisms with a particular focus on customers’ perceptions of 
a price mark-up arising from CSR activities. Hereby, we define CSR engagement as the level to 
which customers perceive a firm to engage in “actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams and Siegel 2001, 
p. 117). Moreover, we develop and verify CSR communication strategies to optimize the effect of 
firms’ social activities on perceived price fairness. To achieve these research goals, we devised 
one qualitative interview study and four large-scale quantitative studies comprising experimental 
and field data from over 4,000 customers. Figure 1 gives an overview of the four studies and the 
conceptual framework, and Web Appendices W7 and W8 describe two further experiments.  
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Drawing on insights from the interviews, Study 1 examines the effect of firms’ CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness moderated by customers’ intrinsic CSR attribution. 
Results reveal that CSR engagement increases perceptions of price fairness for customers who 
attribute the engagement to intrinsic firm motives, but substantially decreases price fairness 
otherwise. Study 2 assesses whether this finding of Study 1 can be explained in terms of 
customers’ perceived benefit and perceived price mark-up arising from CSR engagement. In 
Study 3 we advance the understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the effects of firm CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness by accounting for two different types of CSR (i.e., 
business process and philanthropic CSR) and customers’ resulting inferences regarding firms’ 
CSR costs. We differentiate between the perceived level of firm CSR costs and the perceived type 
of firm CSR costs.  
A key insight that emerged across Studies 1 to 3 is that in the case of customers’ extrinsic 
CSR attribution, a firm’s CSR engagement may afflict price fairness perceptions via customers’ 
perceived price mark-up. To remedy this detrimental effect and provide actionable guidance to 
firms, in Study 4 we develop and empirically verify CSR cost communication strategies. Results 
of a scenario-based experiment show that framing firms’ CSR spending as drawing from top 
management salaries, advertising budgets, or company profits constitutes a viable strategy to 
counter the potentially harmful effects.  
--------------- Insert Figure 1 about here --------------- 
As the first paper to holistically explore the relationship between CSR engagement and 
price fairness perceptions this investigation makes four meaningful contributions to the marketing 
literature. First, prior marketing research has omitted to examine whether a firm’s CSR 
engagement may foster not only customers’ benefit perceptions but also their cost perceptions in 
the form of a price mark-up. Hence, our primary contribution to marketing research is the 
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introduction of customers’ CSR price mark-up perceptions indicating a negative effect of firms’ 
CSR engagement on price fairness and subsequent customer outcomes. Consequently, we find 
evidence that CSR engagement exhibits mixed effects on perceived price fairness via customers’ 
perceived benefit, delineating the positive effect, and perceived costs, delineating the negative 
effect. Second, we add knowledge to marketing research by clarifying that the mixed effects of 
firms’ CSR engagement on perceived price fairness are strongly contingent on customers’ 
intrinsic CSR attribution. For high levels of intrinsic CSR attribution the positive effect of CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness seems to prevail, whereas for low levels of intrinsic CSR 
attributions the negative effect reigns. In this respect, our work is similar to Forehand and Grier 
(2003) as we both focus on the interactive effect of firm CSR engagement and customer 
attributions on customer outcome variables. However, our studies extend Forehand and Grier’s 
findings as we show that customers do not only derive benefits from a company’s CSR 
engagement but also infer firm costs that they expect to be financed through price mark-ups. 
Hereby, we focus on elucidating customers’ cost-related psychological mechanisms concerning 
the CSR–price fairness linkage while Forehand and Grier (2003) investigate the influence of 
firms’ publicly stated CSR motives on customer skepticism. Third, we make an essential 
contribution to CSR research in general. Recently, researchers have stated that “there seems to be 
a lack of understanding of the underlying mechanisms linking CSR with outcomes” (Aguinis and 
Glavas 2011, p. 953), with only 7% of CSR articles focusing on mediation effects. We broaden 
the knowledge in this research stream by introducing customers’ CSR cost-related inferential 
mechanisms.  
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Hypotheses Development: Examining the CSR–Price Fairness Linkage 
Distributive Justice as the Conceptual Basis of Price Fairness 
We define price fairness as “a consumer’s subjective sense of a price as right, just, or legitimate 
versus wrong, unjust, or illegitimate” (Campbell 2007, p. 261). On the most elementary level 
customers’ assessment of distributive price fairness rests on the concept of distributive justice 
(Homans 1961), which is a cornerstone of social exchange theory (e.g., Blau 1964; Thibaut and 
Kelley 1959). According to social exchange theory, customers perceive an exchange relationship 
as fair if the outputs from the relationship at least equal the investment into the relationship 
(Homans 1961). In the context of price fairness, customers assess a product’s price as fair if their 
perceived benefit from the product meets or exceeds their perceived purchase costs (Xia, Monroe, 
and Cox 2004).  
Adopting the concept of distributive justice as our guiding theory, we base our 
conceptualization on the notion that CSR engagement potentially affects customers’ benefit–cost 
comparison. In particular, knowing that the money they spend supports good causes customers 
might perceive an added value (i.e., a “warm glow”) from purchasing a product. As a result, their 
perceived benefit–cost ratio and hence their perceived price fairness may improve. In contrast, 
customers might have perceptions of elevated product costs, believing that prices might be lower 
if a company did not invest part of its revenue in CSR activities. Consequently, customers’ 
perceived benefit–cost ratio and hence perception of price fairness may deteriorate. 
Distinguishing Price Fairness from Related Price Perception Constructs 
The role of price fairness in price information processing. Perceived price fairness constitutes the 
core dependent variable in our conceptual framework. In what follows, to substantiate its 
eligibility and focal role in our model, we distinguish price fairness from related constructs in 
customers’ price perception. To this end, we rely on the price information processing model 
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firmly established by behavioral pricing research (Jacoby and Olson 1977; Niedrich, Sharma, and 
Wedell 2001; Dodds, Monroe, and Grewal 1991). According to this model, customers process 
prices in four steps: (1) perception of objective price, (2) formation of subjective price, (3) price 
evaluation, and (4) price-related behavior. To elaborate, in the first step customers observe and 
decode the price stimulus. In the second step, customers form a subjective understanding of the 
price by assessing their perceived sacrifice, i.e., the monetary loss they suffer when paying the 
price (Zeithaml 1988). The third step of the price information processing model is characterized 
by an integration of customers’ perceived sacrifice with additional informational inputs (Jacoby 
and Olson 1977) in order to evaluate the price stimulus more comprehensively. Hereby, 
behavioral pricing research viewed customers’ perceived quality from the transaction as an 
important additional input to the price evaluation (Zeithaml 1988). Perceived quality reflects 
customers’ assessment of the performance of product attributes (Sweeney and Soutar 2001). 
Specifically, customers engage in a mental trade-off weighing perceived price sacrifice against 
benefits such as perceived product quality to form a price evaluation, resulting in customers’ 
perception of a product’s price–value ratio (Sweeney and Soutar 2001; Zeithaml 1988). 
Importantly, customers’ perceived price fairness likewise belongs to the price evaluation 
phase as it comprises a weighing of perceived benefits and perceived costs (i.e., perceived 
sacrifice). While both price–value ratio and price fairness represent price evaluations and hence 
imply benefit–costs trade-offs, the key difference between these constructs pertains to the strong 
influence of social norms on price fairness formation (Maxwell 2002). More specifically, when 
judging a firm’s price fairness customers do not only account for the economic trade-off of 
benefits and costs (as they do for price–value ratio), but additionally factor in whether the 
company adheres to commonly accepted fairness norms. For instance, derived from the dual 
entitlement principle, if a firm charges high prices owing to high costs, customers may judge the 
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firm’s price–value ratio as low, but customers may still perceive price fairness as high because 
charging higher prices in the face of higher costs may be socially accepted (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1986). As Maxwell (2002, p. 193) puts it: “they [customers] may judge the economic 
acceptability of the price magnitude in relation to their own self-interest, but at the same time 
they judge the social acceptability of the price in relation to community standards or rules”. 
Eventually, in the fourth step, customers’ price evaluation constitutes a key influence on 
their price-related behaviors or behavioral intentions. Hereby, behavioral pricing research 
strongly focused on the analysis of customers’ willingness to pay (WTP) as a key behavioral 
intention (e.g., Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). On the basis of the price information processing 
model price fairness constitutes a predictor of customers’ WTP.  
Motivation for selecting price fairness as focal outcome. Having differentiated perceived 
price fairness from related constructs such as perceived sacrifice, perceived quality, perceived 
price–value ratio and WTP (Zeithaml 1988), we now elaborate on our motivation for selecting 
perceived price fairness as the key dependent variable in our conceptual model. We selected 
perceived price fairness as the key dependent variable instead of alternative price-related 
variables such as WTP for three reasons: First, CSR engagement and perceived price fairness 
exhibit a very high theoretical fit as both concepts are similarly rooted in the fundamental social 
norms of equity and reciprocity prescribed by social exchange theory (Gouldner 1960). That is, 
both, a firm’s social engagement and perceived price fairness, reflect the extent to which the firm 
strives to achieve equity in the exchange relationship with its key stakeholders. Second, our study 
focuses on customers’ inferences of price mark-ups caused by CSR engagement, which have 
been neglected in previous research, as well as customers’ perceived CSR benefits. According to 
the concept of distributive justice, weighing costs―such as an elevated price―and benefits is the 
central process leading to evaluations of price fairness (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004) which 
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underlines the eligibility and, in fact, necessity of perceived price fairness in our model. In their 
seminal work on interpersonal equity in marketing Oliver and Swan (1989) emphasize the need 
to clearly distinguish between equity-based variables reflecting a cost–benefit ratio with variables 
that comprise costs or benefit perceptions only such as perceived quality or perceived sacrifice. 
Third, behavioral pricing research prescribes that WTP constitutes an outcome of perceived price 
fairness because the latter represents an evaluation of price which induces subsequent price-
related behavioral intentions such as WTP (Zeithaml 1984). Confirming this notion, Thaler 
(1985) states that price fairness is a key determinant of WTP. Simultaneously, prior research on 
price information processing clarifies that perceived quality and perceived sacrifice represent 
predictors of price fairness. Consequently, when conceptualizing a fine-grained view of the 
effects of CSR engagement on customers’ perceived CSR benefits and costs, neither perceived 
quality and perceived sacrifice nor WTP are sensible dependent variables. Instead, focusing on 
perceived price fairness as a construct that balances customers’ benefit and cost perception and 
reflects social norms seems reasonable regarding our research goals. Importantly, while we focus 
on perceived price fairness in our conceptual model, we validate our results for perceived 
sacrifice, quality, price-value ratio, and the WTP-related construct willingness to pay more (see 
Table 3) to lend additional support to our conceptualization. 
The Effect of CSR Engagement on Perceived Price Fairness 
In summary, theoretical considerations based on the distributive justice concept suggest that CSR 
engagement may exert mixed effects on perceived price fairness via CSR benefit and price mark-
up perceptions. We argue that whether the positive or negative effect prevails depends on 
customers’ specific inferences regarding a company’s CSR engagement. To gain first insights 
into the CSR engagement–perceived price fairness linkage, we conducted three focus groups with 
four to six participants in each group. Web Appendix W2 provides information on the 
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methodological details and the sample composition of the focus-group study. In the following 
section, we present the results of this preliminary focus group study and also, drawing on existing 
literature, derive formal research hypotheses. 
Perceived benefits of CSR engagement. All focus group participants acknowledged clear 
benefits of CSR engagement for customers. In their eyes, these benefits range from more healthy, 
organic products to the warm glow they feel when purchasing fair trade products or products 
from companies that engage in good deeds. For instance, respondent B noted: “For me 
personally, a labeled fairly traded or ecologically produced product definitely has a higher 
benefit.” Respondent Q elaborated: “If I had to decide between two products, and I could clearly 
see how sustainable or socially responsible both products are, I would most probably choose the 
higher rated product. Because it is worth it.” How do these benefit perceptions translate into price 
fairness? As discussed above, customers consider prices to be fair if their perceived benefit from 
purchasing products meets or exceeds their perceived costs (Homans 1961; Xia, Monroe, and 
Cox 2004). Hence, if CSR engagement increases perceived benefit, customers may evaluate the 
price level as fairer. 
Perceived costs of CSR engagement. In all three focus groups, participants brought up and 
critically discussed the question of costs of CSR engagement and their implications for a 
company’s pricing. Participants agreed that they believed that some companies who engage in 
CSR activities pass along the resulting costs to their customers in the form of increased prices. 
For instance, respondent G asserted: “I really do think the additional costs for CSR are 
compensated by charging higher prices.” Similarly, Respondent F noted: “I think it is very 
complicated because the customer does not know which proportion of the price is really due to 
CSR investments.” 
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Again, the concept of distributive justice helps to explain how such perceptions translate 
into price fairness. In particular, if customers believe that CSR engagement leads to higher prices, 
their perceived benefit-to-cost ratio from purchasing products may drop, leading customers to 
evaluate prices as less fair. Our focus group interviews support this notion. For instance, 
respondent A stated: “If they have spare money, they should do something good with it. But if it 
means that CSR investments have to be compensated by higher prices for us customers, I am 
clearly against that.” Furthermore, respondent K explained: “I think it is just plain unfair if a 
company charges higher prices to support social causes.” 
As outlined above, CSR engagement potentially increases both the benefits and the costs 
customers associate with products, leading to opposing indirect effects of CSR engagement on 
price fairness. We argue that the strengths of these effects depend on customers’ perceptions of 
the CSR engagement. In other words, under certain circumstances the positive effect of CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness via benefit perceptions might prevail, while under other 
circumstances the negative effect via price mark-up perceptions might prevail. We elaborate on 
such a contingency in the following section.  
Moderating effect of CSR attribution. We theorize that the effect of CSR engagement on 
perceived price fairness is moderated by customers’ attributions of a company’s motives for 
engaging in a social cause. In particular, we propose that customers’ perceived price fairness is 
more positively affected by CSR engagement if the company appears to be intrinsically 
motivated and more negatively affected if this is not the case. Many studies have empirically 
observed that customers make assumptions about a firm’s underlying motives for CSR 
engagement and that these beliefs lead to observable outcomes on a behavioral level (Ellen, 
Webb, and Mohr 2006; Webb and Mohr 1998). Attribution theory is typically employed to 
understand underlying psychological mechanisms (Kelley 1967). The literature on customers’ 
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attributions of a company’s CSR effort mainly distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic 
attributions of the company’s motives for a certain CSR commitment (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 
2010). In making extrinsic attributions, customers primarily infer strategic or financial motives 
for a company’s involvement in a CSR activity whereas in making intrinsic attributions they 
perceive the firm to have altruistic, honest motives (Forehand and Grier 2003; Becker-Olsen, 
Cudmore, and Hill 2006). Building on this prior research, we propose that intrinsic CSR 
attribution moderates the indirect effects of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness via 
both perceived CSR benefit and perceived CSR price mark-up.  
Warm glow path. First, regarding the indirect effect via perceived CSR benefit, we argue 
that the positive effect of perceived CSR benefit on perceived price fairness is more pronounced 
the more customers perceive firms’ CSR engagement to be intrinsically motivated—a prediction 
derived from the concept of distributive justice, which suggests that CSR engagement creates an 
emotional value for customers which improves customers’ benefit–cost ratio and hence perceived 
price fairness. However, we argue that the extent to which this incorporation of emotional value 
takes place depends on customers’ attribution of a firm’s CSR engagement. If customers perceive 
engagement to arise from self-serving rather than intrinsic motives, they may doubt the 
authenticity of the engagement and thus be uncertain of their benefit from the CSR engagement 
(Barone et al. 2000). The more uncertain customers feel about their CSR benefit, the less weight 
they may place on this benefit in their price fairness judgments.  
Extra charge path. Second, as to the indirect effect via perceived CSR price mark-up, we 
argue that the positive effect of a firm’s CSR engagement on perceived CSR price mark-up is less 
pronounced the more customers perceive a firm’s engagement to be intrinsically motivated. 
When customers attribute CSR engagement to intrinsic motivation and thus to altruism, they 
should be likely to infer that the company also acts altruistically in financing its CSR engagement 
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to form consistent inferences (Uleman et al. 2008). More specifically, customers should be less 
likely to suppose that the firm marks up prices to cover its CSR costs since this behavior is not 
altruistic and thus conflicts with the firm’s altruistic CSR engagement. In contrast, if customers 
conclude that a firm has self-serving goals underlying its CSR engagement, they should be more 
likely to infer that the company is also acting in a self-serving manner by financing its CSR 
engagement by passing the costs on to the customer.  
Based on the above reasoning, we derive three formal hypotheses. The first of these 
hypotheses refers to the moderated overall effect of CSR engagement on perceived price fairness 
without taking into account customers’ perceived benefit and price mark-up as mediators: 
H1: The overall effect of firm CSR engagement on customers’ perceived price fairness is 
more positive for high levels of intrinsic attributions and less positive for low levels 
of intrinsic attributions. 
The second and third hypotheses refer to the moderated, indirect effects of CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness via our two hypothesized mediators, i.e., customers’ 
perceived CSR benefit and price mark-up. We hypothesize: 
H2a: The more customers attribute the CSR engagement to intrinsic motives, the greater 
the positive indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness via 
perceived CSR benefit. This holds as intrinsic CSR attribution positively moderates 
the effect of perceived CSR benefit on perceived price fairness.  
H2b: The less customers attribute CSR engagement to intrinsic motives, the greater the 
negative indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness via 
perceived CSR price mark-up. This holds as intrinsic CSR attribution negatively 
moderates the effect of CSR engagement on perceived CSR price mark-up.  
 
Firm CSR Costs as the Key Inferential Mechanism of the CSR–Price Fairness Linkage 
To generate a more profound understanding of the CSR–price fairness linkage, we delve more 
deeply into the psychological mechanisms responsible for our predictions in H1 through H2b. We 
argue that the mechanism responsible for the influence of firms’ CSR engagement on customers’ 
perceived price fairness can be explained in terms of customers’ inferences of firms’ CSR costs. 
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We differentiate between the perceived level of costs and the type of costs. The distinction 
between level and type of firm CSR cost builds on seminal work on signaling theory in marketing 
(Kirmani and Rao 2000), which suggests that firm costs may be conceived of as signals to the 
customer to overcome information asymmetries (see also Ippolito 1990; Erdem and Swait 1998). 
We argue that the extent of firms’ CSR engagement fosters perceptions of the level of firm CSR 
costs, while customers’ attributions of CSR engagement to intrinsic or extrinsic motivation are 
associated with the perceived type of firm CSR costs. Hereby, we regard the type of CSR costs as 
the extent to which customers perceive CSR costs as promotional costs (Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, 
and Schwarz 2006). Furthermore, we suggest that the interactive effect of the perceived level and 
type of firm CSR costs needs to be considered when exploring the indirect effects of firms’ CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness. In what follows, we detail our reasoning on the 
perceived level and type of firm CSR costs as the key inferential mechanisms underlying the CSR 
engagement–perceived price fairness relationship. 
Perceived level of firm CSR costs. Applying the logic of Kirmani and Rao’s (2000) cost 
signaling framework, we argue that the stronger a firm’s CSR engagement the more likely 
customers should be to infer high levels of firm CSR costs which in turn increase both customers’ 
perceived CSR benefit as well as CSR price mark-up. To elaborate, if customers perceive a firm 
to be highly engaged in CSR, they should tend to infer high CSR costs, as usually a higher 
number of social activities entails higher expenses (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2010). Prior 
research has established that customers engage in such cost-related inferential reasoning when 
processing marketing campaigns (Kirmani and Wright 1989). High CSR costs may eventually 
lead customers to infer that the firm’s social projects are sufficiently endowed with resources to 
effectively support the targeted social cause (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2010). As a result, 
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customers should be more likely to realize personal benefits from a firm’s CSR engagement—
that is, feel the warm glow of helping others (Andrews et al. 2014). Thus: 
H3:  Firm CSR engagement has a positive indirect effect on customers’ perceived CSR 
benefit via perceived level of firm CSR costs. 
 
Beyond this positive indirect effect of level of firm CSR engagement on perceived CSR 
benefit, we expect the former to exhibit a positive indirect effect on perceived CSR price mark-up 
via perceived level of firm CSR costs. Prior price fairness research posits that customers possess 
basic knowledge of how firms operate and their financial requirements affecting customers’ 
perceived price fairness (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 
2004). As Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004, p. 6) state: “they [customers] develop knowledge of 
marketers’ pricing tactics and of the relative cost–profit composition of a product’s price. This 
metaknowledge, whether accurate or not, guides consumers’ fairness judgments”. Thus, 
customers may expect firms to cover their costs to remain in business (Kalapurakal, Dickson, and 
Urbany 1991). Consequently, customers should be aware that a firm that carries high CSR costs 
must cover these expenses and may feel that “costs may be passed on through price” (Kirmani 
1990, p. 163). We hypothesize:  
H4:  Firm CSR engagement has a positive indirect effect on customers’ perceived CSR 
price mark-up via perceived level of firm CSR costs. 
 
Type of CSR engagement. Interacting with the level of firms’ CSR engagement, we argue 
that the type of CSR engagement (i.e., philanthropic versus business-process CSR engagement) is 
a key characteristic shaping customers’ perceived level of firm CSR costs. Specifically, we 
predict that the positive effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived level of firm CSR cost is 
enhanced for philanthropic CSR engagement, since customers process philanthropic CSR 
engagement differently than business-process CSR engagement. Philanthropic CSR engagement 
comprises social activities targeted to stakeholders outside the firm such as people in need, non-
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governmental organizations, or local communities, and may take the form of monetary donations 
or support through providing equipment. Conversely, business-process CSR engagement focuses 
on intra-organizational stakeholders such as employees and may encompass employee support 
programs or the implementation of a more sustainable value chain (Homburg, Stierl, and 
Bornemann 2013).  
We base our proposition for the interactive effect of level of firm CSR engagement and 
type of CSR engagement on two arguments: First, business process CSR engagement can imply 
significant financial payoffs for the firm, for example in the case of employee support programs 
which have been shown to significantly enhance the work engagement and productivity of the 
workforce (Bhattacharya, Sen, and Korschun 2008). Thus, the firm is a direct beneficiary of the 
CSR engagement itself. In case of philanthropic CSR engagement, potential benefits for the firm 
unfold more indirectly via enhanced attitudes of firm-external stakeholders. When inferring the 
level of a firm’s CSR costs from the level of its CSR engagement, customers may factor in their 
perceptions of the higher direct benefits that firms derive from business-process CSR as 
compared to philanthropic CSR engagement. As a result, customers may infer lower costs from 
business-process CSR engagement than from philanthropic CSR engagement. 
Second, philanthropic CSR engagement implies an instant benefit to society which can be 
measured in cash-value, whereas business process CSR engagement presents a societal benefit 
that is more indirect and may be perceived by customers as only paying off in the long run. 
Although business-process CSR engagement may be equally expensive for firms as philanthropic 
CSR engagement, instances of philanthropy and the dollar value related to this type of CSR 
engagement may thus be more salient to customers (Sen, Bhattacharya, and Korschun 2006). We 
therefore expect that the effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived level of firm costs is 
enhanced for philanthropic CSR engagement. Thus:  
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H5:  The positive effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived level of firm CSR costs is 
more pronounced for philanthropic than for business process CSR engagement. 
 
Intrinsic attributions and type of firm CSR cost. In Study 3 we seek to refine the results of 
Study 2 by providing a detailed explanation of the specific inferential mechanisms underlying the 
firm CSR engagement–perceived price fairness linkage. Therefore, H6 mirrors H2a and H2b where 
we argue that both the positive and negative indirect effects of CSR engagement on perceived 
price fairness via customers’ perceived CSR benefit and CSR price mark-up are moderated by 
customers’ CSR attribution. However, in H6 we focus on the moderating influence of the 
promotional CSR cost type perception, which is closely associated with customers’ CSR 
attribution. In particular, we expect that customers who perceive a firm’s CSR engagement to be 
extrinsically motivated are more likely to perceive the firm’s CSR costs as promotional. If 
customers perceive CSR costs are promotional, customers may be more likely to expect that a 
company marks up its prices to finance these costs and less likely to factor in perceived CSR 
benefit when evaluating price fairness. Consequently, we expect the same pattern of results to 
emerge for the moderating influence of promotional cost type perception as for intrinsic CSR 
attributions in Study 2. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H6:  The greater the extent to which customers perceive firms’ CSR costs as promotional 
costs, the weaker the positive and the stronger the negative indirect effect of CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness. 
 
Study 1: The Contingent Basic Effect of CSR on Price Fairness 
Study 1 investigates the effect of the level of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness in 
a representative cross-industry sample while taking into account customers’ perception of the 
company’s motivation for engaging in CSR (i.e., intrinsic CSR attribution). 
17 
 
Method 
Design of the study. We used a between-subjects scenario experiment and manipulated 
participants’ perceived level of firm CSR engagement. To this end, we recruited 2,248 
respondents, asking them to evaluate one company from a set of 74 firms (30 respondents for 
each company). The 74 companies represented a cross-industry sample of major business-to-
consumer brands as indicated by Interbrand1 (such as Apple, BMW, Gilette, and Walmart). 
Research assistants recruited respondents by asking pedestrians in the inner-city area to 
volunteer, randomly assigning them to either the experimental or the control group. Half of the 
participants (15 respondents per company) were given information about the firm’s most 
prominent CSR engagement to increase their perception of the company’s level of CSR 
engagement. The other half did not receive this information, constituting the low perceived level 
of firm CSR engagement group. 
In the first part of the questionnaire, we provided all respondents with a short description 
of the company (approximately 100 words) and asked them to what degree they were familiar 
with the company and had been customers of the company. Then, we provided the treatment 
group with a text that included information on the most prominent CSR engagement of the 
company (approximately 150 words). The control group received no information on the 
company’s CSR engagements. We took special care to make the text fragments as comparable as 
possible (Web Appendix W3 shows a sample text fragment for one company). All respondents 
were then asked to evaluate the price fairness of the company as well as their perception of the 
level of the company’s CSR engagement. Members of the treatment group were also asked to 
state whether they believed that intrinsic motives drove the company’s CSR engagement. 
                                                 
1 http://www.interbrand.com/de/best-global-brands/2013/Best-Global-Brands-2013-Brand-View.aspx 
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Sample description and measurement. The sample consisted of 2,248 respondents (48.9% 
were male; the mean age was 29.9 years). Of the respondents, 1,180 reported they were familiar 
with the company and indicated they had patronized the company in the past. We chose only 
these respondents for the data analyses as they were able to make an informed judgment of the 
company’s prices. The Appendix shows our measures. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. We compared the mean values of participants’ perception of the level of 
firm CSR engagement between the control and the experimental group (for measurement see 
Appendix). As the experimental group exhibits a significantly higher perceived level of firm CSR 
engagement (Mcontrol group = 3.38; Mtreatment group = 3.81; ΔM = .43, t = 6.73, p < .000), we conclude 
that our treatments had the intended effect. 
Hypotheses testing. We analyzed the effects of the experimental treatment with an 
ANOVA. Perceived price fairness varies significantly across the control and treatment group 
(F(1, 1179) = 4.77, p < .05). For the treatment group perceived price fairness is significantly 
lower than in the control group (Mtreatment group = 4.02; Mcontrol group = 4.13, p < .05). To explore the 
effect of intrinsic CSR attribution and hence test H1, we partitioned the treatment according to 
whether respondents believed the company to be intrinsically motivated to engage in CSR or not. 
As a cutoff point, we chose the median of the variable, which with a value of 4 is identical with 
the midpoint of the scale. For high intrinsic CSR attribution, perceived price fairness is 
significantly higher than for low intrinsic CSR attribution (Mhigh intrinsic CSR attribution = 4.47; Mlow 
intrinsic CSR attribution = 3.73, F(1, 581) = 43.92, p < .05) confirming H1. 
Discussion of Study 1 
Study 1 revealed that the effect of a firm’s level of CSR engagement on customers’ price fairness 
judgments is highly context-sensitive. In cases where customers attribute companies’ CSR 
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activities to intrinsic motives, CSR engagement improved perceived price fairness. Conversely, 
in cases where customers did not attribute companies’ CSR activities to intrinsic motives, CSR 
worsened perceived price fairness. Moreover, as we expected, customers’ perceptions of the 
fairness of the companies’ prices significantly translate to customer loyalty intentions (r = .51, p 
< .000). The subsequent second study of our paper aimed at getting a deeper understanding of the 
underlying psychological processes that influence customers’ price fairness judgments in terms of 
perceived CSR benefit and perceived CSR price mark-up. 
Study 2: Weighing of CSR Benefit and Price Mark-up as Inferential Mechanisms 
Research Context and Data Collection Procedure 
We conducted this study in cooperation with a large international retail company. The company 
engages in a variety of CSR activities that are typical of companies of its size and industry. We 
collected data from 1,703 customers via an online survey. To preclude a selection bias, we 
compared respondents and the company’s overall customer base on a number of variables, 
including age, gender, region, and income. As we found no significant differences (p > .10), 
indicating that respondents were representative of the company’s customer base, we are confident 
that a selection bias is not a major concern in our study. Seeing that our conceptual framework 
links several customer perceptions, we carefully designed the data collection to preclude a 
common method bias: we separated the measurement of independent and dependent variables by 
collecting data via two surveys with a time lag of eight weeks and collected customers’ objective 
revenue from company records for the eight-week period following the second survey (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003). 
Measurement, Reliability, and Validity Diagnostics 
The survey measurements for firm CSR engagement, perceived CSR benefit, perceived CSR 
price mark-up, perceived price fairness, and intrinsic CSR attribution are detailed in the 
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Appendix. We controlled for two potentially intervening variables. First, we included customers’ 
attitude toward CSR (e.g., Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 2004), measured in the second 
survey. Second, we controlled for customer loyalty (e.g., Homburg, Wieseke, and Hoyer 2009), 
measuring it in the first survey to mitigate reverse causality issues. Table 1 shows correlations 
and reliability diagnostics for all variables. All survey measures achieved adequate values for 
Cronbach’s alpha (Nunnally 1978) and average variances extracted (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
Furthermore, all constructs were discriminant according to the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell 
and Larcker 1981). 
--------------- Insert Table 1 about here --------------- 
Results 
Main results. We estimated the path model depicted in Figure 1 via Mplus 7 (Muthén and 
Muthén 2010). For the estimation of the mediation model, we followed recommendations of 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) and estimated the indirect effects as well as the direct effect 
simultaneously. The model achieved an adequate fit (comparative fit index = .98, Tucker-Lewis 
index = .95, root mean square error of approximation = .04, standardized root mean square 
residual = .01). Table 2 shows the estimated path coefficients. In the following, we interpret the 
results of the model estimation in light of H2a and H2b.  
--------------- Insert Table 2 about here --------------- 
In H2a, we proposed that the indirect effect firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR 
benefit  perceived price fairness is more positive for higher levels of intrinsic CSR attribution 
since intrinsic CSR attribution positively moderates the effect of perceived CSR benefit on price 
fairness. Results show that the effect of perceived CSR benefit on perceived price fairness is 
significantly positive (β = .08, p < .01) and moderated by intrinsic CSR attribution (β = .08, p < 
.01). Consequently, the indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness via 
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perceived CSR benefit depends on intrinsic CSR attribution: It is significantly positive as long as 
intrinsic CSR attribution is higher than half a standard deviation below the mean value of the 
scale (see bottom of Table 2). Thus, in full support of H2a, intrinsic CSR attribution positively 
moderates the indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness via perceived 
CSR benefit.  
In H2b, we proposed that the indirect effect firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR price 
mark-up  perceived price fairness becomes more negative for lower levels of intrinsic CSR 
attribution since intrinsic CSR attribution negatively moderates the effect of firm CSR 
engagement on perceived CSR price mark-up. Results show that the effect of firm CSR 
engagement on perceived CSR price mark-up is insignificant (β = .04, p > .05), but negatively 
moderated by intrinsic CSR attribution (β = -.11, p < .01). Consequently, the indirect effect of 
firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness via perceived CSR price mark-up depends on 
intrinsic CSR attribution: It is significantly negative as long as intrinsic CSR attribution is lower 
than quarter a standard deviation below the mean value of the scale (see bottom of Table 2). 
Thus, intrinsic CSR attribution negatively moderates the indirect effect of firm CSR engagement 
on perceived price fairness via perceived CSR price mark-up, supporting H2b. 
Supplemental analyses. We conducted three supplemental analyses to extend and verify 
the robustness of our findings. First, we analyzed whether perceived CSR benefit and perceived 
CSR price mark-up exert a two-way interaction effect, or even three-way interaction effect with 
intrinsic CSR attribution, on perceived price fairness. However, we found no significant 
interaction effects. Second, we analyzed our conceptual model for alternative outcome variables 
beyond perceived price fairness, that is, customers’ perceived price-value ratio, quality, price 
sacrifice, and willingness to pay more. Results are depicted in Table 3 and are largely consistent 
with our main model: (1) The pattern of indirect effects for perceived price–value ratio as an 
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outcome variable is similar to the pattern for perceived price fairness. This finding is to be 
expected, seeing that perceived price-value ratio likewise constitutes a price evaluation in the 
price information processing model (Jacoby and Olson 1977) and is by definition driven by a 
customers’ evaluation of benefits and prices, which according to the concept of distributive 
justice are also the drivers of perceived price fairness (Homans 1961). (2) The pattern of indirect 
effects for perceived quality and perceived price sacrifice as outcome variables is consistent to 
the pattern for perceived price fairness. In particular, perceived quality is only affected by firm 
CSR engagement via perceived CSR benefit whereas perceived price sacrifice is only affected via 
perceived CSR price mark-up. (3) The pattern of indirect effects for willingness to pay more as 
an outcome variable is similar to the pattern for perceived price fairness. This finding is to be 
expected, seeing that WTP-related constructs are likely outcomes of perceived price fairness 
(Campbell 1999; Herrmann, Xia, Monroe, and Huber 2007; Martin, Ponder, and Lueg 2009). The 
high consistency across outcome variables underlines the robustness of our results. 
--------------- Insert Table 3 about here --------------- 
Third, to verify our latter explanation that willingness to pay more represents an outcome 
of perceived price fairness, we estimated a model in which we included both these constructs 
with an additional path from perceived price fairness on willingness to pay more. Results are 
discussed in Web Appendix W4 and suggest that in fact, perceived price fairness serves as a 
mediator in the causal chain linking firm CSR engagement to willingness to pay more. 
Discussion of Study 2 
Our results provide further support for the notion that CSR engagement has mixed effects on 
perceived price fairness and offer a conceptual explanation for this effect. With regard to positive 
effects, customers may draw benefits from a company’s CSR engagement, resulting in more 
favorable price fairness evaluations. However, results show that this causal chain holds only if 
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customers perceive a company’s CSR engagement to be intrinsically motivated. Conversely, 
customers may infer elevated prices from the level of company’s CSR engagement, resulting in 
less favorable price fairness evaluations. Again, we find that this causal chain is highly 
contingent as it holds only for low intrinsic CSR attributions. Lastly, worth noting is that price 
fairness is positively associated with the subsequent revenue of a customer (see Table 2).  
While Study 2 provides first insight into the psychological mechanisms linking a firm’s 
CSR engagement to customers’ price fairness perceptions, the study leaves three questions open 
which we aim to address in Study 3. First, Study 2 focused on customers’ impression of a firm’s 
overall price fairness. To verify the robustness of our results, Study 3 zooms in on one particular 
transaction between a firm and a customer. That is, in Study 3 we examine how customers’ 
perception of a firm’s CSR engagement influences customers’ inferences regarding CSR benefit, 
CSR price mark-up, and price fairness for a specific product. Second, owing to its survey design 
Study 2 was not fully able to establish causal relationships between the level of a firm’s CSR 
engagement and customers’ perceptions of CSR benefits, CSR price mark-ups, and price fairness. 
Hence, to provide stronger evidence for causality, Study 3 comprises an experiment in which we 
manipulated the independent variables and subsequently measured the dependent variables 
through survey scales. Third and most importantly, Study 2 did not address our predictions in H3 
through H6 regarding the roles of the level of firms’ CSR costs, the type of firms’ CSR costs, and 
the type of CSR engagement (philanthropic versus business-process). Therefore, in Study 3 we 
experimentally manipulated level of firm CSR engagement, customers’ CSR attributions 
(intrinsinc vs. extrinsic), and type of CSR (philanthropic vs. business-process activities) to assess 
whether our results from Study 2 might be explained in terms of customers’ firm CSR cost 
perceptions derived from a cost signaling perspective (Kirmani and Rao 2000). 
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Study 3 – Perceived Level and Type of Firm CSR Costs as Inferential Mechanisms 
Method 
Stimuli and experimental design. We acquired 885 customers through a consumer panel (62% 
female; mean age of 42.1 years) and randomly assigned them to eight conditions in a 2 (firm CSR 
engagement: low versus high)  2 (CSR attribution: intrinsic versus extrinsic)  2 (type of firm 
CSR engagement: philanthropic versus business process) between-subjects design. To render the 
scenarios highly realistic to the participants, we simulated the purchase of a brand-name external 
hard drive. In line with prior research, we manipulated customers’ perceptions of the retailer’s 
CSR by providing information on the level and type of the retailer’s CSR engagement and its 
motive for engaging in social activities (e.g., Barone et al. 2000; Andrews et al. 2014). 
Procedure. We instructed customers to imagine that they intended to purchase an external 
hard drive from the electronics brand PowerMart and visited a store of the brand. We then 
provided information on the CSR engagement of PowerMart. In the high CSR engagement 
condition, participants were informed that PowerMart conducts social activities to a high extent, 
while in the low CSR engagement condition participants were told that PowerMart conducts 
social activities to only a low extent (Mohr and Webb 2005). The corresponding treatment 
dummy equips us with a rigorous measure of the level of firm CSR engagement, which allows us 
to conclude how an increase of firm CSR engagement from low to high causally influences our 
variables (Mohr and Webb 2005; Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005). 
Furthermore, building on our proposition in H5 that the effect of firm CSR engagement on 
perceived level of firm CSR costs depends on whether the CSR engagement is philanthropic or 
related to business processes, we manipulated the type of the firm’s CSR engagement. In the 
philanthropic CSR condition, we told participants that PowerMart donates money to people in 
need whereas in the business process CSR condition, we specified that PowerMart designs its 
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supply chain and production processes in an environmentally friendly and sustainable manner 
(Homburg, Stierl, and Bornemann 2013). 
Subsequently, we manipulated participants’ CSR attribution. In the intrinsic CSR motive 
condition, we informed participants that PowerMart engages in social activities owing to a 
genuine interest in societal welfare, whereas in the extrinsic CSR motive condition we depicted 
PowerMart as engaging in CSR activities on profit and image grounds (Du, Bhattacharya, and 
Sen 2007). Finally, we told participants to imagine that when shopping in the PowerMart store 
they found an external hard drive which suits their needs and we provided information on the 
hard drive, including its price. We then surveyed participants on their perceptions of this 
purchase scenario with regard to price and CSR perceptions.  
Measures. The Appendix provides details for all scales. Drawing on a cost signaling 
perspective across H3 to H6 we argue that the mixed effects of firm CSR engagement on 
perceived fairness may be accounted for by customers’ inferences of firm CSR costs. Therefore, 
in Study 3 we newly introduce the constructs perceived level of firm CSR costs and perceived 
promotional CSR cost type adopting scales from Kirmani (1990, 1997) and adjusting them to the 
study’s context. Table 1 shows correlations and reliability diagnostics for all variables. All survey 
measures achieved adequate psychometric properties.  
Control variables. To factor out the effects of other, potentially intervening variables, we 
included a number of controls derived from prior research. In particular, we controlled for 
customers’ price knowledge (Lichtenstein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 1993) and perceived firm 
fairness image (Bolton, Keh, and Alba 2010). 
Results 
Analytical approach. We specified the structural equation path model as displayed in Figure 1. 
The model comprises the hypothesized paths from firm CSR engagement to customers’ perceived 
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price fairness via perceived level of firm CSR costs and customers’ perceived CSR benefit as 
well as perceived CSR price mark-up. Moreover, we included the moderating effect of the type of 
firm CSR engagement on the effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived level of firm CSR 
costs and the moderating effects of promotional CSR cost type perception. To incorporate the 
experimental treatments into the model, we coded three binary dummy variables (Bagozzi and Yi 
1989). These dummy variables represent the three treatments: (1) firm CSR engagement (with 
high engagement coded as 1), (2) intrinsic (versus extrinsic) CSR attribution (with intrinsic 
motive coded as 1), and (3) type of firm CSR engagement (with philanthropic CSR engagement 
coded as 1). As a first step, we verified and found that all manipulations worked as intended. 
Details on the manipulation checks are presented in Web Appendix W5. We estimated the 
proposed models employing Mplus 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2010). 
Hypotheses tests. The model fits the data well (comparative fit index = .95, Tucker-Lewis 
index = .95, root mean square error of approximation = .03, standardized root mean square 
residual = .04). In sum, the model estimation corroborates our predictions (Table 4 depicts results 
of the model estimation). In H3 we predicted a positive indirect effect of firm CSR engagement 
on customers’ perceived CSR benefits via perceived firm CSR level. For the estimation of the 
mediation models, we followed recommendations of Preacher and Hayes (2008) and estimated 
the indirect effects as well as the direct effect simultaneously. The indirect effect of firm CSR 
engagement on perceived CSR benefits is positive and significant, lending support to H3 (βindirect 
= .12, p < .01). In H4 we predicted a positive indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on 
customers’ perceived CSR price mark-up via perceived firm CSR level. The indirect effect of 
firm CSR engagement on perceived CSR price mark-up is positive and significant, lending 
support to H4 (βindirect = .09, p < .01). Furthermore, H5 suggested that the positive effect of firm 
CSR engagement on perceived level of firm CSR costs is more pronounced for philanthropic 
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engagement than for business process CSR engagement (with philanthropic coded as 1), which is 
confirmed (β = .17, p < .01). However, while H5 is supported, for low firm CSR engagement the 
mean level of perceived CSR costs is lower for philanthropic than for business-process CSR, 
which we discuss as an avenue for future research in the discussion. 
Finally, in H6 we proposed that the more customers view firms’ CSR costs as promotion 
costs, the stronger (weaker) the negative (positive) indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on 
perceived price fairness. To test this hypothesis, we calculated the respective indirect effects for 
low and high levels of promotional CSR cost type perception using the coefficients resulting 
from the model estimation (see Preacher and Hayes 2008). As expected, for high perception 
levels of promotional cost type, the negative indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on 
perceived price fairness is significant (βnegative indirect = -.01, p < .05) whereas the positive indirect 
effect is insignificant (βpositive indirect = .01, p > .05). Conversely, for low perception levels of 
promotional cost type, the positive indirect effect is significant (βpositive indirect = .03, p < .01) 
whereas the negative indirect effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness is 
insignificant (βnegative indirect = -.005, p > .05). This result confirms H6. Notably, the direct effect of 
firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness is not significant (β = .02, p > .05), indicating 
that the proposed inferential mechanisms fully mediate this relationship and providing additional 
support to our conceptual framework. Moreover, as we expected, perceived price fairness 
increases customers’ loyalty intentions (β = .40, p < .01). 
--------------- Insert Table 4 about here --------------- 
Discussion of Study 3 
In Study 3 we explored the role of firms’ CSR cost level and cost type as inferred by the 
customer and hence clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying the firm CSR engagement–
perceived price fairness linkage. Results of Study 3 are fully consistent with findings in Study 2 
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and underline that customers’ inferences of firms’ CSR costs play a key role in understanding the 
mixed and contingent effects of firm CSR engagement on perceived price fairness as suggested 
by Kirmani’s and Rao’s (2000) cost signaling framework. Identifying firms’ CSR costs as a key 
mediator in our conceptual framework, we find that a firm’s CSR engagement increases 
customers’ inference of the level of firms’ CSR costs, which in turn enhances both customers’ 
perceived CSR benefit and perceived CSR price mark-up (H3 and H4).  
Moreover, we isolate the type of firm CSR cost, that is, the extent to which CSR expenses 
are perceived as promotional, as the decisive inference underlying the moderating influence of 
intrinsic attributions on the firm CSR engagement–perceived price fairness linkage. We find that 
if customers perceive firm CSR costs as promotional, the negative indirect effect of firm CSR 
engagement on perceived price fairness prevails over the positive effect, with the positive 
exceeding the negative indirect effect if firm CSR expenses are not perceived as promotional 
costs (H6). A limitation to be acknowledged is that in practice the causality between intrinsic 
CSR attribution and promotional CSR cost type perception may be bidirectional: While our 
experimental design supports the conclusion that extrinsic CSR attribution causally increases 
promotional CSR cost type perception, it may well be that framing CSR costs as investments into 
promotion also causally increases extrinsic attribution. 
Lastly, regarding the influence of philanthropic vs. business-process CSR (H5), we could 
confirm our prediction that the effect of firm CSR engagement on perceived level of firm CSR 
cost is enhanced for philanthropic CSR.  
Study 4: Remedy Strategies to Alleviate Negative Effects of CSR on Price Fairness 
In the previous studies we showed that customers who do not attribute a firm’s CSR engagement 
to intrinsic motives evaluate the firm’s prices as less fair. This finding has momentous 
implications for practice since customers frequently attribute CSR engagement to extrinsic 
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motives and are reluctant to change this attribution (Skarmeas and Leonidu 2013). Therefore, a 
crucial question for managers is how to prevent negative effects of CSR engagement on 
customers’ perceived price fairness despite customers’ extrinsic attribution. To answer this 
question, in the following we conceptualize and test corresponding remedy strategies.  
Development of a conceptual basis for these strategies depends on understanding what 
exactly these strategies should remedy. In Studies 2 and 3, we showed that the major reason for 
the decline of customers’ perceived price fairness is that customers assume firms pass on their 
costs of extrinsically motivated CSR engagement through price mark-ups. Two viable remedies 
may thus be to (a) alleviate the positive association between CSR engagement and customers’ 
inferences of price mark-ups and (b) alleviate the negative association between perceived price 
mark-ups and perceived price fairness.  
Building on diagnosticity theory (Feldman and Lynch 1988) and the dual entitlement 
principle (Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986), in the following we argue that managers can 
pursue both remedies (a) and (b) by communicating the sources of the budget for extrinsically 
motivated CSR engagement. More specifically, firms may finance their CSR engagement from 
two generic sources: They may reduce other costs (such as advertising costs or executive salaries) 
to fund CSR engagement or devote a portion of their given profit to CSR engagement. In the 
following, we explain in detail how communicating these sources of the CSR engagement budget 
may alleviate negative effects of extrinsically perceived CSR engagement on perceived price 
fairness. First, diagnosticity theory offers a suitable conceptual frame for convincing customers 
that CSR activities are financed through measures other than price mark-ups (i.e., remedy (a) 
mentioned previously). Diagnosticity theory posits that to make inferences individuals rely on the 
most useful cues available and refrain from using other, less useful cues (e.g., Feldman and 
Lynch 1988; Skowronski and Carlston 1987). Thus, when customers form a judgment of how a 
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firm pays for its CSR engagement, they rely on cues that reveal the source of the CSR budget. If 
a useful cue suggests that CSR engagement is paid for by means other than price mark-ups, 
customers should be less likely to infer such mark-ups. Building on this idea, if firms 
communicate that they finance CSR engagement from the reduction of other costs or from the 
firm’s profit, customers may be less likely to infer a price mark-up and perceive lower price 
fairness (e.g., Feldman and Lynch 1988). 
Second, the dual entitlement principle proposes that even if customers infer price mark-
ups from CSR engagement, these price mark-ups do not necessarily impair perceived price 
fairness (i.e., remedy (b) mentioned previously). More specifically, the dual entitlement principle 
posits that in customers’ view companies are entitled to a reference profit and customers are 
entitled to a reference price (Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). As a result, customers are 
more likely to judge a price increase as fair if a firm faces rising costs or decreasing profits (e.g., 
Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986).  
Based on the dual entitlement principle, we expect that communicating a firm’s CSR 
engagement to be financed from the reduction of other costs or from the firm’s profit alleviates 
the negative effect of perceived CSR price mark-up on perceived price fairness. To elaborate, if a 
firm communicates that its CSR engagement is financed from existing cost budgets, this 
information may raise customers’ awareness for the costs associated with a firm’s social 
activities. Similarly, if a firm communicates that its CSR engagement is financed from its profit, 
customers may acknowledge that CSR engagement negatively impacts a firm’s bottom line. As a 
result of both communication strategies, customers may be more likely to grant a firm the right to 
mark up its prices, alleviating the negative effect of perceived CSR price mark-up on perceived 
price fairness (Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). In essence, we argue: 
H7: Signaling the funding source for an extrinsically attributed CSR engagement 
31 
 
increases customers’ perceived price fairness as compared to not signaling the 
funding source of the CSR engagement budget. 
 
Method 
Stimuli and experimental design. To test H7, we devised a scenario experiment in which we 
simulated the purchase of a pair of jeans from a clothing store engaging in CSR activities. Our 
basic approach is to compare perceived price fairness for a firm’s extrinsically perceived CSR 
engagement with a remedy strategy to extrinsically perceived CSR engagement without a remedy 
strategy and additional control conditions. The design comprised six experimental groups. We 
devised three experimental treatments communicating the budget source of extrinsically 
motivated CSR engagement: Advertising budget (i.e., the reduction of other costs), executive 
salaries (i.e., the reduction of other costs), and profit. To evaluate the effectiveness of these 
treatments, we devised three control groups: (1) extrinsically motivated CSR engagement without 
a remedy strategy—that is, without an indication of the budget source (“no remedy” condition); 
(2) extrinsically motivated CSR engagement including the information that the CSR engagement 
is not financed through a price mark-up (“no price mark-up” condition); and (3) intrinsically 
motivated CSR engagement (“intrinsic attribution” condition). We randomly assigned 245 
customers acquired through an online consumer panel to these six conditions (67% female; mean 
age of 42 years). 
Procedure. We instructed participants to imagine that they intended to purchase a pair of 
jeans from the brand YourStyle and therefore visited a store of the brand. We then provided the 
information that YourStyle engaged in social responsibility activities. Subsequently, we 
manipulated customers’ CSR attribution. In the intrinsic attribution condition, we communicated 
that YourStyle engaged in CSR out of a genuine interest in societal welfare, whereas in all other 
treatments, we communicated that YourStyle engaged in CSR to improve its profit and image 
32 
 
(Barone et al. 2000). We then provided information on the source of the CSR budget. Finally, we 
told participants to imagine that during their store visit they found a pair of jeans that suited their 
needs, priced at €89.99.  
Measures. We surveyed participants’ loyalty intentions and perceived price fairness of the 
pair of jeans using the same operationalization as in Study 3. Both scales achieved very good 
reliability (αcustomer loyalty = .93, αperceived price fairness = .96). 
Results and Discussion 
Hypotheses tests. All manipulations worked as intended. Details on the manipulation checks are 
presented in Web Appendix W6. Using ANOVAs, we tested our hypotheses by analyzing 
differences in participants’ evaluation of perceived price fairness across the treatment and control 
conditions. Figure 2 shows the mean values and ANOVA results. 
--------------- Insert Figure 2 about here --------------- 
H7 proposed that signaling the funding source for an extrinsically attributed CSR 
engagement increases customers’ perceived price fairness as compared to not signaling the 
funding source of the CSR engagement budget. This proposition holds for all treatment 
conditions: Participants evaluated perceived price fairness as significantly higher in each 
treatment condition than in the no remedy condition (p < .05) and not different from the no price 
mark-up (p > .50) and intrinsic attribution (p > .40) conditions. Hence, H7 is supported. Lastly, 
the correlation between perceived price fairness and loyalty intentions is positive and highly 
significant (r = .54, p < .001), showing that in line with our conceptual framework (see Figure 2), 
perceived price fairness is associated with customer loyalty.  
In essence, Study 4 demonstrates that firms may take measures to alleviate the negative 
effects of extrinsically attributed CSR engagement on perceived price fairness. By 
communicating that the budget for their CSR engagement stems either from cost reductions (i.e., 
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from their advertising budget or from a reduction of executive salaries) or from firm profit, firms 
are able to generate price fairness evaluations comparable to those for intrinsically attributed CSR 
engagement.  
General Discussion 
Research Issues 
Prior research on the outcomes of CSR engagement has predominantly focused on customer 
benefits while neglecting to consider that firms’ social activities might trigger price mark-up 
inferences. Consequently, prior marketing research cannot fully explain the firm CSR 
engagement–perceived price fairness relationship since customers evaluate price fairness on the 
basis of both perceived benefits and costs (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004).  
Our study resolves the conceptual ambiguity relating to the firm CSR engagement–
perceived price fairness relationship by showing that firms’ social activities have mixed effects 
on perceived price fairness. Firm CSR engagement increases perceived price fairness for high 
levels of customers’ intrinsic CSR attribution via perceived CSR benefit, while it reduces 
perceived price fairness for low levels of intrinsic CSR attribution via a perceived CSR price 
mark-up. Drawing on work on costs signals in marketing (Kirmani and Rao 2000), we account 
for these findings in terms of customers’ perceived level and type of firm CSR costs. Our 
findings have three key contributions for marketing research. 
First, lending support to recent works that criticized the lack of understanding of 
psychological mechanisms underlying customers’ responses to CSR engagement (Aguinis and 
Glavas 2012), our study indicates that prior CSR research has neglected the inherent complexity 
of customers’ perception of companies’ CSR engagement. Our results point to an important 
oversight pertaining to potential detrimental effects of CSR engagement. While customers benefit 
from a warm glow of helping others (e.g., Koschate-Fischer, Stefan, and Hoyer 2012), they are 
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also aware of the high costs of CSR activities and critically deliberate potential price mark-ups 
resulting from these elevated costs. Thus, customer perceptions of CSR engagement can be 
thought of as two sides of a coin, with the benefit of a “warm glow” on one side and the “cold 
prickle” of costs on the reverse side. 
Second, prior research holds conflicting views on the influence of firm costs on customer 
perceptions. For instance, while cost signaling approaches (Kirmani and Rao 2000) prescribe a 
momentous impact of firms’ costs on customers’ perceptions and behavior (see also Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1986), other studies conclude that “consumers appear to have a poor 
appreciation of the costs faced by firms” (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003, p. 475; see also Guo 
2015). Our findings clearly support the former view by underlining the critical role of customers’ 
cost perceptions in the CSR domain. The elevated apprehension of firms’ CSR costs may result 
from an enhanced focus on firms’ social activities owing to rising levels of customer skepticism 
of CSR (Skarmeas and Leonidu 2013). However, as heightened levels of customer skepticism 
and knowledge are not restricted to the CSR domain, we suggest that customers in general may 
focus more on firm costs. This development implies that cost signaling approaches (e.g., Kirmani 
and Rao 2000) should receive more attention in marketing research on consumer behavior. Our 
results illustrate that the perceived level and type of firm CSR costs as cost signals constitute 
viable explanations for the inferential mechanisms underlying the firm CSR engagement–
perceived price fairness relationship.  
Furthermore, in line with our prediction in H5, we find that the effect of firm CSR 
engagement on perceived level of firm CSR cost is stronger for philanthropic as compared to 
business-process CSR. However, for low levels of firm CSR engagement customers seem to 
associate higher levels of firm CSR costs with business-process CSR engagement (βphilanthropic CSR 
engagementperceived level of firm CSR = -.10, p < .05, see Table 4). This finding discloses interesting 
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avenues for future research to explore customers’ CSR cost perceptions for various CSR types. 
For instance, future work may verify whether customers make cost inferences of CSR types 
rather heuristically, i.e. on the basis of mental accessibility (Feldman and Lynch 1988), or rather 
systematically on the basis of mental calculations.   
Third, a key finding of our study pertains to the negative effect of CSR engagement on 
perceived price fairness via perceived CSR price mark-up in the case of low intrinsic or rather 
extrinsic attributions. We devise and verify CSR communication strategies to remedy the 
potential negative effect of firms’ social engagement on price fairness. Importantly, the remedy 
strategies are based on preventing customers from inferring CSR price mark-ups by guiding 
customers’ perceptions of firms’ CSR costs.  
A limitation of Study 4 is that we do not answer which actions firms can take to change 
customers’ attributions from extrinsic to intrinsic, although knowledge of such actions would be 
highly desirable from a managerial perspective (e.g., Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2010; Vlachos et 
al. 2009; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, and Schwarz 2006). Thus, examining ways to change customers’ 
CSR attributions provides an interesting direction for future research, which could potentially 
leverage existing insights from attribution theory and the schemer schema. 
Managerial Implications 
Prior research has somewhat misled CSR managers in that numerous studies have established a 
variety of positive outcomes of CSR engagement, such as an improvement of corporate 
reputation, customer loyalty, and willingness to pay. However, our studies show that CSR is not a 
universal remedy to improve customer attitudes. We provide evidence that CSR engagement 
potentially reaches its limit as soon customers evaluate a company’s price fairness. To optimally 
manage both CSR communication and a company’s pricing, managers need to be aware of the 
underlying mechanisms. Our studies provide two core recommendations. 
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First, managers need to understand that customers regard a company’s CSR investment as 
both beneficial and costly, causing mixed effects of CSR activities on price fairness. These 
results suggest that managers should frame the benefit/cost ratio of their CSR activities in a 
positive light by fostering customers’ benefit perceptions while toning down cost perceptions. 
Second, managers need to generally bear in mind that customers’ attributions of the 
company’s CSR motives play a crucial role in price fairness evaluations. CSR engagement only 
increases perceived price fairness if customers view the engagement as intrinsically motivated. 
Hence, managers should make sure that customers perceive a company’s motives to engage in 
CSR actions in a positive light. This is a challenging task, as simply framing motives as intrinsic 
may actually arouse customers’ suspicion (Ellen, Webb, and Mohr 2006). Therefore, managers’ 
best shot may be to communicate CSR engagement in an authentic and honest way. They should 
also pretest CSR communication to examine how this communication affects inferences 
regarding motives in the market place. In this respect, our fourth study provides actionable advice 
for managers seeking effective communication strategies to publicize their CSR spending, 
preventing backlash effects in the case of extrinsic attribution. More specifically, explicit 
statements that a firm’s CSR spending is extracted from top management salaries, advertising 
budgets, or company profits constitute viable remedy strategies to counter potentially harmful 
effects on price fairness. 
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FIGURE 1. Overview of the Conceptual Framework 
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FIGURE 2. Results of Study 4 
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TABLE 1 
Study 2 and Study 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Study 2 
Variable M SD α AVE 1 2 3 4     
1. Firm CSR engagement 5.28 1.30 .98 .80         
2. Perceived CSR benefit 4.07 1.41 .88 .75 .49**        
3. Perceived CSR price mark-up 3.63 1.26 .80 .55 .05* .11**       
4. Perceived price fairness 5.26 1.06 .90 .78 .31** .30** -.10**      
5. Intrinsic CSR attributiona 4.29 1.41 ―a ―a .57** .62** .03 .35**     
Study 3 
Variable M SD α AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Firm CSR engagementb ―a ―a ―a ―a         
2. Intrinsic CSR attributionb ―a ―a ―a ―a .00        
3. Philanthropic CSR engagementb ―a ―a ―a ―a .00 .00       
4. Perceived level of firm CSR costs 3.45 1.13 .98 .91 .40** .05 .01      
5. Perceived CSR price mark-up 4.77 1.17 .81 .62 .22** -.02 .04 .35**     
6. Perceived CSR benefit 3.86 1.36 .93 .81 .17** .13** .01 .42** .22**    
7. Perceived price fairness 3.69 1.34 .97 .93 .14** .17** -.02 .27** .05 .41**   
8. Promotional CSR cost type perception 5.45 1.08 .96 .88 .00 -.09** .05 -.02 .14** -.12** -.13**  
9. Customer loyalty 2.91 1.45 .95 .87 .18** .13** -.02 .35** .07* .61** .59** -.11** 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
Note: M = Mean, SD = standard deviation, α = Cronbach’s alpha, AVE = average variance extracted, a Single item measure, b dummy variable
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TABLE 2 
Study 2: Estimated Path Coefficients 
Path Hypothesis Estimated Coefficient 
Warm Glow Path   
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR benefit  .17** 
Perceived CSR benefit  perceived price fairness  .08** 
   
Extra Charge Path   
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR price mark-up  .04n.s. 
Perceived CSR price mark-up  perceived price fairness  -.09** 
   
Outcome   
Price fairness  customer revenue  .06* 
   
Interaction Effects   
Perceived CSR benefit  intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived price fairness H2a: + .08** 
Firm CSR engagement  intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived CSR price mark-up H2b: - -.11** 
   
Main Effects of Moderator   
Intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived price fairness  .19** 
Intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived CSR price mark-up  .02n.s. 
   
Controlled Effects   
Firm CSR engagement  perceived price fairness  .03n.s. 
Firm CSR engagement  customer revenue  -.00n.s. 
Intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived CSR benefit  .48** 
Attitude toward CSR  perceived CSR benefit  .07** 
Attitude toward CSR  perceived CSR price mark-up  .02n.s. 
Attitude toward CSR  perceived price fairness  .08** 
Customer loyalty  perceived CSR benefit  .07** 
Customer loyalty  perceived CSR price mark-up  -.11** 
Customer loyalty  perceived price fairness  .26** 
Customer loyalty  customer revenue  -.02n.s. 
 Level of Intrinsic CSR Attribution 
Simple Slopes -1*SD -.75*SD -.5*SD -.25*SD Mean +.25*SD +.5*SD +.75*SD +1*SD 
Perceived CSR benefit  
 perceived price fairness 
.02 
(p = .52) 
.04 
(p = .24) 
.04 
(p = .08) 
.07 
(p = .02) 
.08 
(p = .00) 
.10 
(p = .00) 
.11 
(p = .00) 
.13 
(p = .00) 
.14 
(p = .00) 
Firm CSR engagement  
 perceived CSR price mark-up 
.12 
(p = .00) 
.10 
(p = .00) 
.08 
(p = .01) 
.06 
(p = .05) 
.04 
(p = .21) 
.02 
(p = .53) 
.00 
(p = .95) 
-.02 
(p = .66) 
-.04 
(p = .39) 
Indirect Effects  
(tested simultaneously)          
Firm CSR engagement  
 perceived CSR benefit  
 perceived price fairness (H2a) 
.00 
(p = .52) 
.01 
(p = .24) 
.01 
(p = .09) 
.01 
(p = .03) 
.01 
(p = .01) 
.02 
(p = .00) 
.02 
(p = .00) 
.02 
(p = .00) 
.02 
(p = .00) 
Firm CSR engagement  
 perceived CSR price mark-up  
 perceived price fairness (H2b) 
-.01 
(p = .01) 
-.01 
(p = .01) 
-.01 
(p = .03) 
-.01 
(p = .08) 
-.00 
(p = .23) 
-.00 
(p = .54) 
.00 
(p = .95) 
.00 
(p = .67) 
.00n.s 
(p = .41) 
n.s. not significant, p > .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed); we report standardized coefficients; SD = standard deviation. 
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TABLE 3 
Study 2: Estimated Path Coefficients for Alternative Outcomes 
 Dependent variable 
Path Perceived  price fairness 
Perceived  
price-value ratio 
Perceived 
quality 
Perceived 
price sacrifice 
Willingness  
to pay more 
Warm Glow Path      
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR benefit .17** .17** .17** .17** .17** 
Perceived CSR benefit  dependent variable .08** .04n.s .12** -.03n.s. .21** 
Extra Charge Path      
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR price mark-up .04n.s. .04n.s. .04n.s. .04n.s. .04n.s. 
Perceived CSR price mark-up  dependent variable -.09** -.07** -.00n.s. .20** -.05* 
Interaction Effects      
Perceived CSR benefit  intrinsic CSR attribution  dependent variable .08** .07** .11** -.02n.s. .06** 
Firm CSR engagement  intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived CSR price mark-up -.11** -.11** -.11** -.11** -.11** 
Main Effects of Moderator      
Intrinsic CSR attribution  dependent variable .19** .16** .16** -.09** .28** 
Intrinsic CSR attribution  perceived CSR price mark-up .02n.s. .02n.s. .02n.s. .02n.s. .02n.s. 
Indirect Effects      
Level of intrinsic CSR attribution: Low      
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR benefit  dependent variable .00n.s. -.00n.s. .01n.s. -.00n.s. .03** 
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR price mark-up  dependent variable -.01** -.01* .00n.s. .03** -.01
n.s. 
(p = .056) 
Level of intrinsic CSR attribution: High      
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR benefit  dependent variable .02** .02** .03** -.01n.s. .04** 
Firm CSR engagement  perceived CSR price mark-up  dependent variable .00n.s. .00n.s. .00n.s. -.01n.s. .00n.s. 
n.s. not significant, p > .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed); we report standardized coefficients; controlled effects are included analogously to Study 2, but not displayed in this table. 
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TABLE 4 
Study 3: Estimated Path Coefficients 
Path Hypo-thesis 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Main Effects CSR Engagement   
Firm CSR engagement   perceived level of firm CSR costs  .30** 
Firm CSR engagement   perceived price fairness  .02n.s. 
   
Extra Charge Path   
Perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR price mark-up  .31** 
Perceived CSR price mark-up  perceived price fairness  -.08* 
   
Warm Glow Path   
Perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR benefit  .41** 
Perceived CSR benefit   perceived price fairness  .17** 
   
Main Effects of Moderators   
Intrinsic CSR attribution   promotional CSR cost type perception  -.09* 
Philanthropic CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  -.10* 
Promotional CSR cost type perception   perceived price fairness  -.10** 
Promotional CSR cost type perception   perceived CSR price mark-up  .17** 
   
Interaction Effects   
Firm CSR engagement  philanthropic CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs H5: + .17** 
Promotional CSR cost type perception  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR price mark-up  .10* 
Promotional CSR cost type perception  perceived CSR benefit  perceived price fairness  -.12** 
   
Controlled Effects   
Customer price knowledge   perceived price fairness  -.28** 
General firm fairness image   perceived price fairness  .49** 
Intrinsic CSR attribution   perceived price fairness  .06* 
Philanthropic CSR engagement  perceived price fairness  -.02n.s. 
Firm CSR engagement   perceived CSR benefit  .01n.s. 
Intrinsic CSR attribution   perceived CSR benefit  .10** 
Firm CSR engagement   perceived CSR price mark-up  .09** 
Intrinsic CSR attribution   perceived CSR price mark-up  -.02n.s. 
Perceived price fairness   customer loyalty  .40** 
Perceived CSR benefit   customer loyalty  .42** 
Indirect Effects   
Firm CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR benefit H3: + .12** 
Firm CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR price mark-up H4: + .09** 
Level of Promotional Cost Type Perception: Low   
Firm CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR benefit  perceived price fairness H6: + .03** 
Firm CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR price mark-up  perceived price fairness  .00n.s. 
Level of Promotional Cost Type Perception: High   
Firm CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR benefit  perceived price fairness  .01n.s. 
Firm CSR engagement  perceived level of firm CSR costs  perceived CSR price mark-up  perceived price fairness H6: - -.01* 
n.s. not significant, p > .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed); we report standardized coefficients. 
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APPENDIX: Measurement Scales 
Construct Definition Measurement Items* Source 
Firm CSR 
engagement 
[Study 1 & 2] 
Actions appearing to advance some 
social good, beyond the interests of the 
firm and beyond what is required by law 
 [COMPANY NAME] … 
1. … values ecological sustainability.  
2. … acts in a responsible way regarding the environment.  
3. … donates parts of its earnings to charity on a regular basis.  
4. … donates money for people in need. 
5. … treats employees in a socially responsible way.  
6. … cares for their employees beyond the regulatory framework. 
7. … engages in local community support projects.  
8. ... cares for the people in the communities in which it operates 
Lichtenstein, 
Drumwright, and Braig 
(2004); Luo and 
Bhattacharya (2006); 
McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001); Sen and 
Bhattacharya (2001);  
Perceived price 
fairness 
[Study 1] 
A customer’s evaluation of a price as just 
The prices which [COMPANY NAME] charges are fair. 
Bolton, Keh, and Alba 
(2010); Campbell 
(2007); Martin, Ponder, 
and Lueg (2009) 
Perceived price 
fairnessa 
[Study 2, 3 & 4] 
How do you evaluate [COMPANY NAME]‘s prices?d 
1. unfair / fair 
2. not at all just / just 
3. unreasonable / reasonable 
4. inadequate / adequatec 
Perceived CSR 
benefit  
[Study 2 & 3] 
A customer’s perception of receiving 
additional value from purchasing 
products due to the CSR engagement of 
a company 
1. I derive benefit from supporting good causes by purchasing [COMPANY NAME] 
products. 
2. After purchasing at [COMPANY NAME] I am satisfied as my money helps support the 
good. 
3. I enjoy that [COMPANY NAME] uses my money to support the good. 
Andrews et al. (2014) 
Perceived CSR 
price mark-up 
[Study 2 & 3] 
A customer’s perception of elevated 
product prices due to the CSR 
investments of a company 
1. I believe [COMPANY NAME]‘s prices include a mark-up for the company’s support of 
good causes. 
2. I think [COMPANY NAME] has priced its corporate social responsibility activities into 
its products. 
3. I think [COMPANY NAME] could reduce its prices if it didn’t engage as much in 
corporate social responsibility. 
Own operationalization 
Intrinsic CSR 
attribution 
[Study 2, 3 & 4] 
A customer’s perception that a company 
engages in CSR out of genuine concern 
1.  [COMPANY NAME] engages in charitable projects because it is genuinely concerned 
about being socially responsible. 
2. I think that [COMPANY NAME] engages in its social projects due to altruistic motives.c 
3. I think [COMPANY NAME]’s social engagement results from an honest wish to do 
good.c 
Du, Bhattacharya, and 
Sen (2007) 
Customer loyalty 
[Study 1, 3 & 4] A customer’s commitment to repurchase 
from or repatronize a vendor in the future 
It is very likely that I would … 
1. … purchase from [COMPANY NAME] in the future. 
2. … recommend [COMPANY NAME] to friends. 
3. … remain a customer if [COMPANY NAME] increased its prices. Homburg, Wieseke, and Hoyer (2009) 
Customer loyalty 
[Study 2] 
1. How likely is it that you will patronize [COMPANY NAME] again in the future?b 
2. How likely is it that you will recommend [COMPANY NAME] to a friend?b 
3. I can say only positive things about [COMPANY NAME]. 
Attitude toward 
CSR 
[Study 2] 
A customer’s normative endorsement for 
firms’ social activities 
Companies should … 
1. … act in a responsible way regarding the environment.  
2. … value ecological sustainability. 
3. … regularly donate parts of their earnings for charity.  
4. … donate products for people in need. 
5. … treat their employees in a socially responsible way.  
6. … care for their employees beyond the regulatory framework. 
7. … engage in local community support projects in the communities in which they 
operate.  
Lichtenstein, 
Drumwright, and Braig 
(2004); Mohr and 
Webb (2005) 
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8. ... care for the people in the communities in which they operate. 
Perceived price-
value ratioa 
[Study 2] 
A customer’s perception of the degree to 
which a company’s product performance 
and product prices are in balance 
Products of [COMPANY NAME] … 
1. … have a very poor price-value ratio / … have a very high price-value ratio 
2. … do not offer value for money / … offer value for money 
3. … are not good products for their prices / … are good products for their prices 
Sweeney and Soutar 
(2001) 
Perceived 
qualitya 
[Study 2] 
A customer’s perception of the degree of 
a company’s product performance 
Products of [COMPANY NAME] … 
1. … have very poor quality / … have very high quality 
2. … are inferior / … are superior 
3. … are poorly made / … are well made 
Sweeney and Soutar 
(2001) 
Perceived price 
sacrifice 
[Study 2] 
A customer’s perception of a company’s 
price level 
1.  [COMPANY NAME] has very high prices. 
2. Products of [COMPANY NAME] are very expensive 
Bornemann and 
Homburg (2011)  
Willingness to 
pay more 
[Study 2] 
A customer’s willingness to remain a 
customer of a company in case of an 
increase of the company’s price level 
relative to other companies 
1. I am willing to pay a higher price at [COMPANY NAME] than at its competitors. 
2. I would like to keep buying at [COMPANY NAME], even if other companies were 
cheaper. 
3. For the advantages I have as a customer of [COMPANY NAME] I would be willing to 
pay a higher price. 
Zeithaml, Berry, and 
Parasuraman (1996) 
Perceived level 
of firm CSR 
costs 
[Study 3] 
A customer’s subjective perception of the 
amount of money that a firm invests in 
social activities 
1. PowerMart bears considerable costs for its social activities. 
2. The amount of money that PowerMart invests for its social projects is very large. 
3. PowertMart incurs very high costs for its social engagement. 
Kirmani (1990, 1997) 
Promotional 
CSR cost type 
perception 
[Study 3] 
The extent to which a customer 
perceives a firm’s CSR spendings as 
self-serving to promote its image 
1. I regard PowerMart’s costs for its social activities as costs to improve its image. 
2. I regard PowerMart’s costs for its social activities as costs to improve its public 
reputation. 
3. I regard PowerMart’s costs for its social activities as costs to improve its standing. 
Kirmani (1990, 1997) 
General fairness 
image 
[Study 3] 
A customer’s perception of a firm’s 
general disposition towards achieving 
equitable exchange relationships with its 
stakeholders 
1. PowerMart is a just company. 
2. PowerMart treats its customers in fair way. 
3. PowerMart appears just to me. 
Bolton, Keh, and Alba 
(2010) 
Customer price 
knowledge 
(reverse coded) 
[Study 3] 
The extent to which a customer is 
familiar with regular price levels for a 
specific product 
1. I am not familiar with regular price levels for external hard drives. 
2. I do not know what one usually has to pay for an external hard drive. 
3. I do not know what an adequate price level for an external hard drive would be. 
Lichtenstein, Ridgway, 
and Netemeyer (1993) 
Firm CSR 
engagement 
(manipulation 
check) 
[Study 3] 
A customer’s perception whether a firm 
adheres to high standards of social and 
ethical obligations 
1. PowerMart is a company that acts socially responsible. 
2. PowerMart cares for the well-being of society. 
3. PowerMart holds high ethical standards. 
Du, Bhattacharya, and 
Sen (2007) 
CSR typea 
(manipulation 
check) 
[Study 3] 
Focus of a firm’s CSR either on 
business process or philanthropic CSR 
The social engagement of PowerMart focuses on … 
1. … the sustainability of its processes / … helping people in need Own operationalization 
CSR budget 
source 
(manipulation 
check) 
[Study 4] 
A customer’s perception of where the 
funding of CSR engagement originates 
YourStyle’s expenses for CSR engagement … 
1. … pay for themselves through additional revenue. 
2. … are financed from YourStyles’s advertising budget. 
3. … are financed by reducing executive salaries. 
4. … are financed from YourStyle’s profit. 
Own operationalization 
All items are measured on seven-point Likert scales anchored “fully disagree” to “fully agree” unless indicated otherwise. 
a measured on seven-point differential, b anchored “very unlikely” to “very likely.” c Addition in Study 3 and Study 4, d In Study 3 and 4 a specific price was provided (see study description). 
